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Abstract
Prior research has found that persons who favor more analytic modes of thought are less
religious. We propose that individual differences in analytic thought are associated with
reduced religious beliefs particularly when analytic thought is measured (hence, primed)
first. The current study provides a direct replication of prior evidence that individual differ-
ences in analytic thinking are negatively related to religious beliefs when analytic thought is
measured before religious beliefs. When religious belief is measured before analytic think-
ing, however, the negative relationship is reduced to non-significance, suggesting that the
link between analytic thought and religious belief is more tenuous than previously reported.
The current study suggests that whereas inducing analytic processing may reduce religious
belief, more analytic thinkers are not necessarily less religious. The potential for measure-
ment order to inflate the inverse correlation between analytic thinking and religious beliefs
deserves additional consideration.
Introduction
Dual process models of cognition suggest that human thought can be categorized into analytic,
rational processes and intuitive, experiential processes [1, 2]. The intuitive, experiential System
1 is theorized to operate automatically, with little to no conscious thought. System 1 contains
processes common to other animals, including emotional and experiential processes [2]. By
contrast, the more logical System 2 is thought to underlie distinctly human processes such as
abstract reasoning and deliberate, conscious thought [2].
Research has suggested that intuitive thought processes underlie religious beliefs [3, 4, 5, 6].
Beliefs about mind-body dualism, agency, and morality have all been linked to intuitive pro-
cesses [5] and are also important for religious beliefs [6]. Furthermore, young children rely
mainly on intuitive systems [7] and also show a propensity towards body-soul dualism and
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sensitivity to agency [4]. Thus, the intuitive System 1 appears to undergird at least some forma-
tive aspects of religious beliefs.
More direct evidence for the relationship between dual process models and religious beliefs
was reported by Gervais and Norenzayan (Study 1), who found that individual differences in
intuitive versus analytic processing correlate with religious beliefs, such that more analytic
thinkers endorse less religious beliefs [8]. Other researchers have found similar negative corre-
lations between analytic thinking and religious beliefs [9, 10, 11, 12]. Taken together, these
findings suggest that persons who favor deliberate, logical thought are less swayed by religious
faith.
We propose that the relationship between individual differences in analytic thought and
religious beliefs is not as strong as previous evidence has suggested. More precisely, we propose
that the negative correlation between analytic thought and religious beliefs is strongest when
individuals have engaged the analytic system prior to reporting their religious beliefs. Thus, the
measurement order used in Gervais and Norenzayan (Study 1) may have inflated the strength
of the relationship between analytic processing and religious beliefs.
Specifically, Gervais and Norenzayan (Study 1) had participants complete the cognitive
reflection test (CRT) [13] before reporting their religious beliefs [8]. The CRT consists of three
word problems that require analytic processing to solve correctly. Although ambiguity exists
regarding the extent to which analytical thought processes are engaged when participants give
incorrect answers on the CRT [14, 15], it is clear that arriving at correct answers on the CRT
requires analytic thought. Therefore, scores on the CRT may have negatively predicted reli-
gious beliefs in the study by Gervais and Norenzayan because correctly answering CRT ques-
tions primed analytic processing prior to the measure of religious beliefs. This idea is bolstered
by the follow-up studies reported by Gervais and Norenzayan, in which experimental induc-
tions to increase analytic processing (e.g., experiencing cognitive disfluency as in Study 5)
reduced religious beliefs [8].
Indeed, several prior experiments have used the CRT to activate an analytic mindset. For
example, research by Paxton, Ungar, and Greene found that completing the CRT before mak-
ing moral judgments led to a positive correlation between analytic thinking and utilitarian (i.e.,
less emotional) moral reasoning, whereas the correlation disappeared if the moral reasoning
task was completed first [16]. These results imply that the observed differences in moral rea-
soning were due to the temporary activation of an analytic mindset upon completing the CRT
first, rather than stable individual differences in analytic thinking.
By having participants complete the CRT prior to reporting religious beliefs, Gervais and
Norenzayan likely activated an analytic mindset in participants who answered analytically (i.e.,
correctly), temporarily suppressing religious beliefs [8]. As a result, the strength of the relation-
ship between individual differences in analytic thinking and religious beliefs may have been
inflated by first activating the analytic system, rather than representing a pure (i.e., confound-
free) relationship between individual differences in analytic thinking and religious beliefs.
The current study had two main goals. First, we sought a direct replication of the finding
that individual differences in analytic thinking are negatively related to religious beliefs when
the two constructs are measured in the typical order (i.e., analytic thinking assessed first) [8].
Second, we tested the hypothesis that the relationship between religious beliefs and analytic
thought is reduced when religious beliefs are measured first. We registered these hypotheses on
Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/v34gw/) prior to data analysis. We found support for
both predictions, which suggests that the relationship between individual differences in ana-
lytic thinking and religious beliefs is influenced by measurement order. Furthermore, in light
of prior evidence linking the need for cognition (NFC) and religiosity [11], we also included a
measure of need for cognition (NFC) at the end of the study to allow for exploratory analyses
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probing the relationship between NFC and religious beliefs; these analyses yielded additional
support for the measurement order hypothesis.
Method
Ethics statement
The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Texas A&MUniversity. A
waiver of written informed consent was approved by the IRB because the study involved no
more than minimal risk to participants. Participants read an information sheet presented
before they could access the study. If participants consented to participate, they clicked a but-
ton and the study began. Participants’ responses thus reflect documentation of consent.
Participants
Gervais and Norenzayan (Study 1) sampled 179 students [8]. We aimed to sample at least as
many participants for each of the two conditions in the current study. To account for incom-
plete responses we oversampled, and 454 undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory
psychology class accessed the study online. Twelve students did not complete the study and 32
failed the attention check (see below). The remaining 410 participants (318 female, 275 Cauca-
sian,M = 18.55 years, SD = 1.02 years) were randomly assigned between the analytic first
(n = 205) or religious beliefs first (n = 205) conditions.
Materials and Procedures
Analytic task. Participants completed the cognitive reflection test (CRT), which consists
of three logic puzzles that can be answered analytically or intuitively [13]. For example, the
question, “A bat and a baseball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How
much does the ball cost?” brings to mind the intuitive answer of $0.10. However, after further
examination, it is apparent that the correct answer is $0.05. For all three questions on the CRT,
the intuitive responses are incorrect. The number of correct answers formed the measure of
analytic thinking (M = 0.74, SD = 0.92).
Religious beliefs measure. As in Gervais and Norenzayan [8], participants completed
measures of intrinsic religiosity [17] (e.g. “My faith involves all of my life”;M = 4.70, SD = 1.58,
α = .94), intuitive religious belief [8] (e.g. “I just don’t understand religion” reversed coded;
M = 5.77, SD = 1.32, α = .87), and belief in supernatural agents [8] (e.g. “God exists”;M = 6.05,
SD = 1.53, α = .93), all anchored from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). The three
scales were highly interrelated (rs between .69 and .85, ps< .001). We calculated a composite
score combining all three scales (M = 5.22, SD = 1.41, α = .96).
Final questionnaires. Last, participants reported demographic information and com-
pleted the need for cognition (NFC) scale [18] (e.g. “I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and
for long hours”;M = 3.26, SD = 0.65, α = .88), the brief self-control scale [19], and encountered
an attention check requiring a click on a circle instead of a Likert rating [20]. Participants who
failed the attention check were excluded from all analyses. We present results for the NFC scale
below, but the other questionnaire (i.e., the brief self-control scale) was included for explor-
atory purposes will not be discussed further.
Statistical programs. All statistics reported except for the bootstrapped analysis were cal-
culated using SPSS Version 22.0 [21]. The bootstrapped analysis was performed in R [22].
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Results
Preliminary analyses
We first performed a chi-square analysis to ensure that the distribution of analytic answers on
the CRT did not differ between the analytic first and religious beliefs first conditions. The chi-
square test was non-significant, χ2 (3) = 3.28, p = .35, indicating that the proportion of analytic
answers on the CRT did not differ by condition. Next, we examined mean responses on all var-
iables of interest to determine if they differed by condition. Please refer to Table 1. As expected,
there were no significant mean differences by condition on the number of analytic answers on
the CRT, t (408) = -0.69, p = .488; NFC, t (408) = 0.46, p = .646; intrinsic religiosity, t (408) =
0.56, p = .576; intuitive religious beliefs, t (408) = 0.36, p = .721; belief in supernatural agents,
t (408) = -0.84, p = .401; or the composite religiosity scale, t (408) = -0.40, p = .689.
Main analyses
Our primary interest was the relationship between analytic thinking (i.e., CRT scores) and reli-
gious beliefs. We examined this relationship as a function of experimental condition. In the
analytic first condition, we found significant negative correlations between analytic thinking as
measured by the CRT and religious beliefs: rReligiosity (205) = -.17, p = .018; rIntuitive (205) = -.23,
p = .001; rAgents (205) = -.19, p = .006. These results directly replicated Gervais and Norenzayan
(Study 1) [8].
When participants completed the religious beliefs measures first, however, scores on the CRT
were no longer related to religious beliefs: rReligiosity (205) = .04, p = .603; rIntuitive (205) = .004,
p = .95; rAgents (205) = -.03, p = .725. Using Fisher’s r-to-z transformation we found that the cor-
relations differed significantly between the conditions for two of the religiosity measures,
zReligiosity = 2.05, p = .040; zIntuitive = 2.34, p = .019, and were not significantly different for the
third, zAgent = 1.71, p = .087.
To further examine the relationship between CRT scores and religiosity, we regressed the
religiosity composite score on task order (analytic first or religious beliefs first), analytic think-
ing score, and their interaction. A bootstrapped regression with 9,999 iterations showed mini-
mal estimate bias (BBias< 0.002) [23], so only the standard regression estimates are reported.
As shown in Table 2, we found a significant effect for analytic thinking (i.e., scores on the
CRT), and a significant interaction between task order and analytic thinking.
To probe the two-way interaction we calculated simple slopes at 1 SD above and below the
mean in analytic thinking. In the analytic first condition the relationship between analytic
thinking and religious beliefs was significant and negative, b = -0.31, t (406) = 2.81, p = .005,
Table 1. Composite Religiosity Scores as a Function of Condition and Number of Analytic Answers on the CRT.
Number of Analytic Answers on CRT
Condition 0 1 2 3 Total
Analytic First n = 110
5.36 (0.12)
n = 52
5.30 (0.18)
n = 35
4.76 (0.28)
n = 8
4.14 (0.67)
n = 205
5.19 (0.10)
Religious Beliefs First n = 107
5.27 (0.13)
n = 53
5.09 (0.20)
n = 29
5.50 (0.30)
n = 16
5.22 (0.36)
n = 205
5.25 (0.10)
Total n = 217
5.31 (0.09)
n = 10
5.19 (0.13)
n = 64
5.09 (0.21)
n = 24
4.86 (0.33)
n = 410
Number of participants answering 0, 1, 2, or 3 CRT items correctly in each condition, followed by their average religiosity composite score (with standard
errors in parenthesis).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0138922.t001
Revisiting Analytic Thinking and Religiousness
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0138922 September 24, 2015 4 / 10
whereas in the religious beliefs first condition the same relationship was non-significant,
b = 0.02, t (406) = 0.23, p = .815. See Fig 1.
Secondary analyses
We further examined the relationship between analytic thinking and religious belief by opera-
tionalizing analytic thinking as scores on the need for cognition (NFC) scale. Presumably, indi-
viduals higher in NFC engage in more analytic thinking when they complete the CRT than do
individuals lower in NFC. If that is the case, then NFC should be negatively correlated with reli-
gious belief, particularly in the analytic first condition.
Indeed, when participants completed the analytic thinking task first we found significant
negative correlations between NFC and intrinsic religiosity, r (205) = -.18, p = .011, and NFC
and belief in supernatural agents, r (205) = -.17, p = .017, respectively, and a non-significant
negative correlation between NFC and intuitive religious beliefs, r (205) = -.12, p = .080. These
patterns mirror findings reported by Pennycook et al. (Study 1) [11].
Table 2. Regression Analysis for Analytic Thinking and Religiosity (n = 410).
Religiosity Composite Score
Variable B SE(B) β t p
Analytic Thinking Score -0.311 0.110 -.205 -2.81 .005
Task Order -0.184 0.177 -.066 -1.04 .300
Task Order X Analytic Thinking 0.335 0.150 .186 2.23 .026
R = .140
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0138922.t002
Fig 1. Religious Beliefs as Function of Task Order and Analytic Thinking.Religious beliefs composite score as a function of task order and analytic
thinking (CRT score). The solid line is the analytic first condition, whereas the dashed line is the religious beliefs first condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0138922.g001
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When participants completed the religious beliefs measures first, however, NFC was no
longer correlated with any of the religious beliefs measures: intrinsic religiosity r (205) = .06,
p = .394; intuitive religious beliefs r (205) = .06, p = .384; belief in supernatural agents
r (205) = .03, p = .647. The correlations differed between the conditions for intrinsic religiosity
z = 2.43, p = .015, and belief in supernatural agents z = 2.03, p = .042, and were non-significant
for intuitive religious beliefs z = 1.82, p = .069. Hence, the results are virtually the same regard-
less of whether CRT performance or NFC is used as the measure of analytic thinking.
Because CRT scores and NFC were positively correlated in both experimental conditions
(analytic first r = .23 p = .001; religious beliefs first r = .337 p< .001), we repeated the regres-
sion of the religious belief composite on CRT scores, this time controlling for NFC scores. As
shown in Table 3, we found a significant effect of CRT scores and a significant task order by
CRT score interaction. As before, we conducted simple slopes at one standard deviation above
and below the mean for analytic thinking and found a significant negative relationship between
religious beliefs and analytic thinking when analytic thinking was measured first, b = -0.296, t
(406) = 2.64, p = .009, but no significant relationship between them when religious beliefs were
measured first, b = 0.103, t (406) = 0.986, p = .325.
Discussion
We replicated the negative relationship between analytic thinking and religious beliefs as
reported by Gervais and Norenzayan (Study 1) [8], but only when analytic thinking was mea-
sured first. Reversing the measurement order reduced the relationship to non-significance.
Furthermore, the pattern of results was the same regardless of whether individual differences
in analytic thinking were operationalized as scores on the CRT or scores on the NFC. Thus,
analytic thinking appears to relate to religious beliefs primarily when the analytic system is
primed before assessing religious beliefs. These results suggest that activating analytic thought
changes the relationship between analytic thinking and religious beliefs.
We found a significant change in the relationship between analytic thinking and religiosity
depending on which measure came first. As can be seen in the registered hypotheses on the
Open Science Foundation website (https://osf.io/sdnhv/?view_only =
febcb81890264988a19942417be5221b), we did not predict nor did we find an effect of mea-
surement order on mean levels of religiosity or analytic thinking. The implication is that com-
pleting an analytic thinking task reduces religious beliefs only among more analytic thinkers. A
majority of the participants were decidedly intuitive thinkers (i.e., they answered all the CRT
questions incorrectly). Hence we did not expect all participants to show changes in religious
beliefs after completing the analytic thinking measure because most participants do not engage
analytic thought on the CRT. It is thus not surprising that mean-level religiosity ratings did not
differ between the task order conditions.
Table 3. Regression Analyses for Analytic Thinking and Religiosity, Controlling for Need for Cognition (n = 410).
Religiosity Composite Score
Variable B SE(B) β t p
Need for Cognition -0.086 0.112 -.040 0.78 .439
Analytic Thinking Score -0.296 0.112 -.195 2.64 .009
Task Order -0.191 0.178 -.068 1.07 .284
Task Order X Analytic Thinking 0.339 0.150 .189 2.26 .025
R = .145
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0138922.t003
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Cognitive Reflection Test and analytic thinking
There is some debate in the literature regarding the usefulness of the CRT as a measure of ana-
lytic thinking. Specifically, biases in thinking may occur at a variety of processing stages (e.g.,
failure to draw upon relevant prior knowledge, failure to inhibit alternate strategies), which
may have different cognitive ramifications despite yielding the same behavioral outcome [14].
Furthermore, related research using syllogisms and other logic problems to measure analytic
thinking cautions against using normative answers to measure analytic thinking, as analytic
thought processes may also be activated for incorrect solutions [24]. Nonetheless, the CRT has
objectively correct answers that require analytic processing to achieve. It is thus reasonable to
assume that, on average, individuals who answer CRT questions correctly engage in more ana-
lytic processing relative to those who answer intuitively or provide incorrect answers.
The relationship between analytic thinking and religiosity
The current investigation was inspired by the studies reported by Gervais and Norenzayan [8],
but other studies are also relevant to the current findings. For instance, Pennycook and col-
leagues reported negative correlations between religious beliefs and analytic thinking as mea-
sured by the CRT [10], as did Gervais in two recent studies [25]; however, like Gervais and
Norenzayan, these researchers measured analytic thinking with the CRT prior to measuring
religious beliefs. Based on the results from the current experiment, we propose that such find-
ings partly reflect the effect of activating the analytic system among more analytic thinkers and
do not reflect a pure or confound-free assessment of the relationship between individual differ-
ences in analytic thought and religious beliefs.
Some studies have found inverse correlations between analytic thinking and religious beliefs
when religious beliefs were measured first. Shenhav, Rand, and Greene (Study 1) found an
inverse relationship between the number of analytic responses on the CRT and belief in God
despite measuring religious beliefs before the CRT [9]. Research by Pennycook and colleagues
found a negative relationship between religiosity and various measures of analytic thinking
when religiosity was measured in a prescreening session and analytic thinking was measured at
a later point in time (Study 2 and 3); they also found a negative relationship between NFC and
religiosity (Study 1) [11]. These results appear to conflict with the current study, which found a
negative correlation between analytic responses and religious belief only when participants
completed the CRT before reporting their religious beliefs.
Key methodological differences may explain the seemingly different patterns of results. Spe-
cifically, Shenhav et al. embedded their key measures among a larger survey that included mea-
sures of hypothetical monetary discounting, political attitudes, and responses to different
political issues [9]. Because these additional measures took place prior to or between the mea-
sures of interest, and because the current results suggest that the link between analytic thinking
and religious beliefs is sensitive to measurement order, the different results may stem from the
differences in measurements and measurement order. It is plausible, for example, that complet-
ing the delay discounting measure induced an analytical mindset prior to the measure of belief
in God in Shenhav et al., which may have inflated the relationship they observed between reli-
gious beliefs and analytic thinking. Indeed, delayed discounting rates have been associated with
increased activity in the prefrontal cortex [26] and with working memory [27], both of which
are commonly associated with analytic modes of thought.
Similarly, in Pennycook et al. (Study 1), prior to measuring religious beliefs, [11], partici-
pants completed 18 base-rate problems by choosing which of two possible outcomes was more
likely. Six of the base-rate problems were specifically designed to be incongruent (i.e., they con-
tained stereotypes that conflicted with base-rate information defined in the problem).
Revisiting Analytic Thinking and Religiousness
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Response incongruence has been shown to activate the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), an
area in the brain related to response conflict and performance on executive functioning tasks
requiring conflict monitoring [28]. As such, it is possible that the base-rate problems activated
the analytic system and thus enhanced the correlation between analytic thinking (as assessed
by the NFC scale) and religiosity. Additionally, in the other study reported by Pennycook and
colleagues, it is unclear if other measures (e.g., measures that may have induced analytic
thought) were administered in the prescreening session prior to the religiosity measure (Study
2) [11]. Given that the results of the current study suggest that responding to only three ques-
tions in an analytic manner prior to reporting religious beliefs was sufficient to influence the
relationship between analytic thinking and religious beliefs, it is possible that unreported mea-
sures in the prescreening session of the studies in Pennycook et al. were sufficient to activate an
analytic mindset before religious beliefs were assessed. Without further information, it is diffi-
cult to draw clear conclusions regarding the implications of the current findings for the results
reported by Pennycook et al. [11].
The current study, unlike the previous studies, measured religious beliefs and analytic
thought with no separation or other measures included between them, thereby providing a
clean assessment of the two constructs free from any possible interfering effects of other tasks
and measures. Given the finding that the relationship between analytic thinking and religiosity
was susceptible to order effects, it is clear that future research is needed to further explore the
extent to which the relationship between the two constructs is driven by stable individual dif-
ferences versus situational or contextual priming of more analytic modes of thought. Our find-
ings imply that individual differences play a smaller role than prior research would suggest and
highlight the importance of situation or contextual priming.
Cognitive Reflection Test and order effects
One additional implication of the current research is that studies using the CRT as an individ-
ual difference measure of analytic versus intuitive thinking should be mindful of potential
order effects. Completing the CRT appears to influence subsequent responding on unrelated
tasks, and perhaps especially so when participants arrive at correct (i.e., analytic) responses.
Many studies have used the CRT to measure individual differences in analytic and intuitive
thinking but have not counterbalanced measurement order or considered the potential effects
of administering the CRT prior to other measures of interest [13, 17, 29]. Future research
should examine the extent to which activating more analytic modes of thought influences
other measures.
Conclusion
The results of the current study emphasize the dynamic interrelation between intuitive and
analytic processing systems, especially in regards to religious beliefs. We replicated the relation-
ship between analytic thought and religious disbelief, but only when analytic thought was mea-
sured first. Assessing religious belief prior to assessing analytic thinking reduced this
relationship to non-significance. Future research should examine order effects when probing
dual process phenomena, especially when using measures that activate analytic thinking styles,
such as the CRT. The current results suggest that the relationship between religiosity and ana-
lytic thinking is not as straightforward as prior research suggests. More analytic thinkers are
not necessarily less religious, and the relationship hinges on what comes first: thinking analyti-
cally or thinking about religion.
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